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THE decision of the Behring Sea Arbitrators, rendered
at Paris on the fifteenth day of last August, marked the
close of one of the most important international controversies of recent times. The original subject of complaint
was the seizure by the United States of three Canadian
sealing vessels in Behring Sea, in the summer of 1886, for
the alleged violation of an act of Congress which forbade!
the taking of fur-seals in Alaskan waters. The British
Foreign Office at once protested tlat these seizures were
illegal because they had been made in the open sea at a
greater distance from land than three miles, and therefore
outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
A prolonged diplomatic controversy between the two governments ensued. Mr. BAYARD, who was then Secretary
of State, sought to solve the problem by proposing that the
various nations interested in the seal fisheries should unite
in an international convention providing for their suitable
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regulation. Although the prospect of this result being
accomplished appeared for a time to be very promising, the
plan ultimately failed because of the refusal of Great Britain
to proceed with it against the remonstrance of Canada.
Under President HARRISON'S ,administration more British
schooners were seized, and Mr. BLAINE, who had meanwhile succeeded Mr. BAYARD as Secretary of State, asserted
the fight of the United States to protect the seals in this
manner on the two-fold ground of our having succeeded by
the Treaty of 1867 to certain alleged rights of Russia in
Behring Sea, and of the urgent necessity of such measures
in order to prevent the seal herd from being destroyed.
,The stand thus taken by Mr. BLAINE met with such pronounced and continued opposition from the British Government tlat it became evident in the course of time that no
satisfactory -solutiona of the difficulty could be reached
through ordinary diplomatic negotiations. It was therefore proposed that the questions in dispute between the two
countries, with reference to the ownership and regulation
of the Alaskan seal fisheries, should be referred to international arbitration. Effect was given to this proposal by
the Treaty of February 29, 1892, which provided for the
creation of a Board of Arbitration composed of seven members, of whom two were to be appointed by the President of
the United States, two by the Queen of England, one by
the President of France, one by the King of Italy; and one
by the King of Sweden. By Article VI of this Treaty the
Arbitrators had referred to them, in the first place, certain
points bearing on the question whether the United States
had acquired from Russia, upon the purchase of Alaska in
1867, any extraordinary proprietory rights in Behring Sea;
in the second place, whether the United States had any right
of protectipn or property in the.fur-seals when found outside
of the three-mile limit. Article VII of the Treaty provided
that if these legal questions should be so decided as to
deprive the United States of the right to make necessary
regulations for the protection of the seal fisheries without
the concurrence of Great Britain, the Arbitrators them-
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selves should then determine what regulations outside of
the jurisdictional limits of the two countries were necessary,
and over what waters they should extend. The question
whether any damages were due from the United States
for past seizures was not submitted to the tribunal at all,
but was reserved as a subject for future negotiation be-"..
tween the two governments.
The decision just rendered by the Arbitrators may, be
described as favorable to England in theory, and to the
United States in practice. Every disputed point of law submitted to them by the Treaty was decided against our Government, but the regulations which they prescribed were of
such a stringent character as to afford to our national interests in the seal fisheries almost as much protection as we
ourselves would have been able to give them had the legal
points been decided in our favor. The important features of these regulations are three in number, and comprise : Fir~t, the prohibition at all times of pelagic sealing
within a circle drawn -around the, Pribyloff Islands at a distance of sixty nautical miles ; second, the establishment of
a close season for fur-seals during the months of May, June'
and July, within which time sealing is prohibited over the
whole of Behring Sea and that part of the Pacific Ocean
lying north of the thirty-fifth parallel of latitude and east
of certain defined boundaries; third, the prohibition of the
usL of nets, fire-arms and, explosives in taking seals. Various less important regulations were also made as to the
character of the vessels which should be allowed to engage
in the industty, and of their crews, requiring, for example,
that such vessels should be licensed, that they must be sailing vessels and carry a distinguishing flag, and that they
must make regular reports to their respective governments
as to the times and places at which sealing has been carried one.-he principal object which these regulations were
intendtdLo promote was the protection of the seals, especially the pregnant females, during their annual migration
in the months of May and June from the waters of the
Pacific to their home on the Pribyloff Islands in' the centre
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of Behring Sea, and also to protect during the summer
Months the female seals when frequenting the waters adjacent to these islands in search of food for their young. The
sixty-mile zone and the close season of three months which
the Arbitrators have established are well adapted to secure
these results. When the seals migrate back again to the
Pacific Ocean on the approach of cold weather in the autumn, they stand in no especial need of protection, because
at that time the sea is usually so rough as to render marine
sealing too dangerous an occupation to pursue, and also because the skins of the seals during that period are in a condition which renders them less valuable for commercial purposes. In this connection it is interesting to note that of the
fourteen vessels seized by the United States in the years
1886, 1887 and 1889, nine were captured while engaged in
sealing operations at times and places forbidden by the
above regulations, while of the remaining five three were
seized within two days of the close season just established,
and the other two within five miles of the protective zone.
All of these fourteen shipswould likewisehave beenguilty of
violating the present regulations by reason of their having
employed fire-arms to kill seals. The total prohibition by
the Arbitrators of the use of fire-arms in pelagic sealing,
with the single exception that shot-guns may be used- outside of Behring Sea, is a most important feature of the regulations, for the reason that in the past nearly all of the objectionable seal killing has been effected in that way. The
number of seals which can be killed in the open sea by
other weapons, such as spears and harpoons, is so small as
to be of little practical account. It is now incumbent upon
both the United States and Great Britain to enforce these
regulations by appropriate national legislation; and if in
addition to such legislation the Governments of the two
countries see fit to adopt the recommendation of the tribunal that all seal killing shall be suspended for a period of from
one to three years, it is probable that the recent depletion
of the Alaskan seal fisheries will be checked, and that the
herd will once more regain its former proportions.
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It has been intimated in certain quarters that the Behiing Sea Arbitration has not proved to be of any real benefit
to the United States for the reason that equally good regulations might have been secured through ordinary diplomatic negotiations, if our State Department had confined
itself exclusively to that end instead of asserting supposed
principles of law which were destined to be overruled.
The incorrectness of such criticism becomes apparent when
we compare the regulations which have just been prescribed
with various other sets of regulations which were suggested
at different times prior to the arbitration, and consider the
causes which prevented any of them from being adopted.'
For example, at a very early period in the diplomatic
negotiations, Mr. BAYARD, who was then Secretary of State,
suggested in a letter, dated February 7, 1888, and addressed'
to Mr. PHELPS, our Minister at London, that the United
States, Great Britain, and other interested powers should
unite in establishing a close season for fur-seals from April 15
to November i, and extending over the area of sea lying
north of latitude 500, and -between longitudes 16o' west
and I 70 east. Lord SALISBURY expressed himself as well

pleased with the general plan thus suggested, and the
matter seemed to be progressing toward a favorable issue,
when, as already stated, the negotiations were suddenly
broken off by the refusal of Great Britain to proceed with
them in oppqsition to the wishes of Canada. The fact that
the interests of certain Canadians would be injured by any
restrictions imposed upon pelagic sealing, has constituted
a perpetual obstacle to any settlement of this question
between the two countries by ordinary diplomatic methods.
It has appeared very clearly from the beginning that had it
not been for this circumstance, we should have had no
difficulty in coming to terms with the British Government,
for the reason that that country is equally interested with
ourselves in the preservation of the fur-seals since the greater
part of the skins secured in Behring Sea are prepared in
London for commercial uses. In the summer of 1889 more
British ships were seized for taking seals, and further corre-
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spondence, took place between the two Governments. On
April 3o , I89o, SirJULIAN PAUNCEFOTE, the British Minister
at Washington, informed the State Department that, for the
purpose of protecting the seal fisheries pending an investigation by a commisiion of scientists as to certain disputed
facts relating to the industry, he was prepared to recommend to his Government, as a provisional measure, the prohibition of pelagic sealing in Behring Sea during the months
of May, June, October, November and December, and at
all times within a distance of ten miles of the Pribyloff
Islands. Our Government declined to accede to this proposal upon the ground that a te4-mile zone around the
islands was altogether inadequate to protect the female
seals when frequenting the sea during the summer months
* in search of food. Later in the same year Mr. BLAINE, in
a letter addressed to the British Minister at Washington
on December 17, 189o, expressed his willingness to agree
to regulations which should prohibit pelagic sealing within
sixty miles of the islands from May 15 to October 15 of
each year-regulations far less favorable to the United
States than those which the Arbitrators have recently prescribed, inasmuch as the latter not only give us as large a
protective zone around the islands as that asked for by Mr.
BLAINE, but prohibit sealing therein continuously, and in
addition establish a three-months' close season over the
remainder of Behring Sea and the North Pacific, and prohibit the use of fire-arms in Behring Sea at all times. The
great success of the arbitration in point of practical results
also becomes apparent when we compare the terms prescribed by the Arbitrators with a set of regulations, conceded to us by Great Britain during the argument at Paris.
On June 2o, Sir RICHARD WEBSTER, one of the British
counsel, submitted a proposal to the Tribunal of Arbitration, that sealing should be prohibited within a radius of
twenty miles of the islands, that the use of rifles and nets
should be forbidden, and that a close season should be
established extending from September 15 to July I. It
will be observed that these proposed regulations were
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almost as unfavorable to us in some respects as the provisional terms stated by Sir JULIAN PAUNCEFOTE in
April, 189o , who suggested a zone of ten miles, whereas

the arbitrators adopted Mr. BLAINE'S suggestion, and
gave us a"zone of sixty miles. In connection with these
regulations a most important victory was won by our
counsel at Paris in their successful resistance to the efforts
of the British counsel to induce the Board of Arbitration
to make whatever reguqlations they might decide upor,
conditional upon the acceptance and enforcement by the
United States of supplementary regulations upon the'
Pribyloff Islands. The Arbitrators declined either to prescribe or to recommend any regulations with respect to
the taking of seals on United States territory.
The successful outcome of the arbitration in this mat-"
ter of regulations was made possible by the skill and foresight of Mr. BLAINE at a critical point in the diplomatic
negotiations which preceded the Treaty of Arbitration. In
his letter of December 17, i89o, already referred to, he

replied to a previous offer of Great Britain to arbitrate certain other points by suggesting, as a more suitable subject
for arbitration, substantially the same five questions'of law
which were afterwards embodied in the Treaty. Foreseeing the possibility that these questions might be decided
adversely to the United States, he added a sixth paragraph,
providing that, in that event, the Arbitrators should determine what regulations were essential for the preservation
of the seal herd on the high seas, and with some slight
change of form, this paragraph was subsequently embodied
in Article'VII of the Treaty of Arbitration. It is to this
circumstance, supplemented by the skill of Mr. PHELPS
and our other counsel at Paris, in convincing the Arbitrators that most stringent measures were needed to preserve the seals, that the successful outcome of the arbitration
is due. In many respects we are in a better position than
if the legal points had been decided in our favor. Had
that been the case, our Government would have been subjected to the entire responsibility and expense of guarding

THE DECISION OF THE

.the seals against foreign depredators over areas of open sea
covering many thousands of miles. The present situation
appears to be that, whereas England formerly objected to
all marine protection for the seals whatsoever, she is now
compelled, by the decree of the Board of Arbitration, to
co-operate with our Government in enforcing regulations
which effectually deprive her subjects of all substantial
benefit from the seal fisheries, while our own interests in
that respect will be better protected than they have been
at any time in the past.
The Tribunal of Arbitration which has just decided the
Behring Sea question was one of such exalted dignity, and
its ,individual members men of such great eminence, that
any adverse criticism of the manner in which they dealt
with the legal questions submitted to them would be altogether out of place.. It is, perhaps, not too much to say
that no court of greater dignity has ever sat to administer
justice at any period in the history of the world. Hence
when such a tribunal decides a legal question, or enunciates a proposition of international law, rules and principles so laid down must be regarded thenceforth as
altogether removed from the sphere of controversy. But
the character and scope of such rules and principles, and
the manner in which they are likely to be applied in other
cases, are useful subjects of discussion, and now that this
. particular case has been finally and conclusively, determined, it is in order to inquire as to its probable bearing
upon future international disputes, and the extent to
which it is likely to be cited as a precedent. It is, perhaps, not too much to say that the legal principles which

have been enunciated by the Board of Arbitration in the
present instance are so fundamental, and deal with subjects
of such wide importance, that -theirdecision is destined to
become a permanent and conspicuous land-mark in the
development of international law. Between the conflicting
practices of different nations, in matters of maritime jurisdiction, a sharp line has now been drawn separating the
legal from the illegal, and many questions which previously
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were open subjects of discussion must now be regarded as
closed and settled. It is my purpose to state certain general propositions of international law which would appear to
follow in logical order from the decision which the Arbitrators ha~ie pronounced.
I. In the first place, this is probably the last occasion
in the history of the world upon which any nation will
claim to be the exclusive owner of any portion of the open
sea. It was contended by our Government in the present
case that Russia, by the Ukase of 182i, and by the subsequent exercise of authority in Behring Sea, had acquired
therein certain exceptional proprietary rights, which passed
to the United States at the time of the purchase of Alaska.
It was not, except at a very early period of the negotiations,
claimed that Behring Sea was a mare clausum, or closed
sea, but it was contended that we had derived from Russia
exclusive rights of jurisdiction as to all matters relating to
the seal fisheries. The Arbitrators, however, decided that
Russia never exercised such an exclusive jurisdiction in
Behring Sea, and that, consequently, no rights of this
character passed to the United States by the Alaska Treaty.
In view of this decision, it is unlikely that the claim will
ever again be made that any considerable area of the high
seas can become the property of any one nation or the
subject of exclusive maritime jurisdiction for any purpose
whatsoever. It is safe to assume that the ancient doctrine
that the higl seas are susceptible of ownership, as illustrated three centuries since, in the claims of Spain to the
Indian Ocean, and of England to the "narrow geas" adjoining her coasts,.has now passed away, and that this decision will stand as an insurmountable barrier to its ever being
revived. It is the last mile-stone in the progress of international law from the mediaval idea of marine property to
the modern theory that the high seas are free.
II. In the second place, the decision of the Arbitrators
practically adopts the rules of the English common law as
to the ownership of wild animals by individuals, and makes
them part of international law as regards such ownership
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by nations. Since no wild animal at all similar to the furseal ever figured before in an international dispute, it
became necessary for our Government, in the absence of
precedents bf this character, to turn to the common law for
soWe principle which would sustain our claim to ownership
in the seal herds.' Accordingly, it was argued in our behalf
that seals in international law were analogous to such animals as bees, or carrier pigeons, at the common law, which,
as BLACKSTONE said, continued to be the property of their
custodian even when flying at a great distance from home,
because of their having a fixed intention to return (animus

reverlendi). On the other hand, it was asserted in behalf
of Great Britain by Sir CHARLES RUSSELL, that this animus
revertendionly conferred the right of property in wild animals at the common law when it was induced by. artificial
means, such as taming them, or offering them food. Hence,
.he argued, it involved a confusion of ideas to claim that
the seals were American property because they migrated at
certain periods to 'a particular place, since they were led to
do this, not by artificial, but by natural causes. As they
resembled in this respect many other wild animals, there was
no reason, he contended, why the same rule of law should
not apply to them, and according to that rule of law such
animals remain the property of their owner only so long as
they continue on his domain. The Arbitrators appear to
have been convinced by this reasoning, since they have
decided that the United States has no right of property in
the fur-seals when they are found outside of our territorial
waters. The rules and distinctions of the common law on
this subject have thus been transplanted into the domain of
international law, and the decision of the Arbitrators supports the further inference that there is no such thing in
international law as a national right of property in a herd
or body of wild animals as a whole, apart from the ordinary
right of property in each individual animal inherent in its
custodian during the time.that his possession of it lasts.
III. The decision of the Arbitrators establishes the
further proposition of international law that beyond the
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limits at which its property right in a wild animal ceases,
a nation has no authority to enforce any measures for its
protection, even though such measures are necessary to
preserve the species. Conceding that in the present case
the United States had no right of property in the fur-seals
when found outside of territorial waters, the question still
remained whether our Government did not have the right
to surround them with such a degree of protection on the
high seas as might be essential to save an important
national industry from destruction, and to preserve the furseal species for the general benefit of the world. Many
facts of natural history were invoked in support of such a
right. It was proved that the fur-seals are all born on bur
territory, that the Pribyloff Islands are their regular abode,.
that they would remain there continuously were it not for.
the cold winter climate, and that they regularly return
there with the'approach of summer. It was said that these
facts supplied a basis for ascribing to the United States, if
not a general property right in the seals, at least such a
qualified right of property as would sustain a limited
national jurisdiction on the high seas for the purpose of
protecting them against wasteful and .destructive methods
of attack at the hands of foreigners. In the brief of the
United States the broad. proposition was asserted, based
upon numerous foreign precedents, which seemed amply to
support it, that it is "a principle established by international usage that any nation which has a peculiar interest
in the continued existence of any valuable marine product,
located in the high seas adjacent to its coasts or territorial
waters, may adopt such measures as are essential to the
preservation of the species, without limitation as to the
distance from land at which such necessary measures may
be enforced.'" This was the question at issue: Is it consistent with the established rules of international raw to
hold that certain facts of natural history, having reference
to the origin, habits, and mode of propagation of wild animals -like fur-seals, or that the existence of certain valuable
commercial interests, pertaining either to a single nation,
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or to the world at large, can render a particular method of
taking such animals wrong, which otherwise would be lawful, and confer upon the nation most interested the right to
prevent such a mode of capture by the exercise of force on
the high seas ? It seemed to our Government that such a
right might properly be held to exist in such a case. The
Arbitrators, however, have held that it does not. The effect
of this decision will be to restrict the right of a nation to
protect its wild animals and marine products within the
same limits as define its right of ownership, which, as we
have seen, are coterminous with the outer margin of,its
territorial waters.
IV. This last proposition leads directly to another,
which is more far-reaching and of wider application than
any which has hitherto been -stated. If the right of
,national protection to wild animals and other marine pro'dncts does not extend for any purpose beyond a nation's
territorial waters, then it follows that all the fishery legislation of the world so far as it relates in any degree to
-fisheries which are more than three miles from land, is, as
regards nations not parties to such legislation, illegal and
void. At' this point the decision of the Arbitrators begins
to have gn important practical bearing outside of the particular subject of dispute which was referred to them in
in this case. In the first place, it follows inevitably that
all the regulations now in force, for the protection of other
seal herds, will have to be restricted hereafter to the
three-mile limit. The United States produced evidence
before the Board of Arbitrators, that at the Falkland
Islands, a British dependency off the coast of Patagonia, a
close time for seals is enforced over a strait which is twentyeight miles wide. In the British colony of New Zealand
stringent laws for the protection of all seal fisheries have
been enacted, which authorize the seizure of offending
vessels anywhere within the limits of the colony, which by
a special act of the British Parliament, were made to include
areas of open sea hundreds of miles in extent. In view of
the present decision it will necessarily be illegal henceforth
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to enforce these regulations at a greater distance than three
miles from the different islands which comprise the colony.
Directing our attention now to instances of laws enacted
for the extra-territorial protection of other marine products,
here are the regulations governing the pearl fisheries of
Ceylon, which were used with such effect by Mr. Blaine in
his diplomatic correspondence. The most recent of these
regulations, issued in 189o, absolutely prohibits all persons from fishing for chanks, b&ches-de-mer, corals and
shells over an area of water extending seaward for a distance of from six to twenty miles. The government
of Italy regulates numerous coral fisheries located at
distances of from three to fifteen miles from the coast of
Sardinia, and of fourteen, twenty-one and thirty-two miles
respectively off the southwest coast of Sicily. The French
colony of Algiers regulates its coral beds for a distance of
seven miles fr6m land. The United States of Columbia
regulates its pearl fisheries in the Pacific for a distance of
thirty miles from the coast of Panama. Mexico has made
numerous grants of exclusive privileges in the pearl fisheries off the east coast of Lower California, extending seaward ten kilometres, or about six miles. Great Britain
regulates the oyster fisheries on the southeast coast of
Ireland for a distance from land of twenty miles; and the
herring fisheries on the northeast coast of Scotland, over
waters which at some points are more than thirty miles from
land. Norway has established a close season for whales
over an area of the Arctic Sea thirty-two miles in width,
and Russia regulates the hair-seal industry over a section
of the White Sea which has a width of fifty-three miles.
These are some of the foreign statutes which were cited by
the United States in support of its claim to a right of jurisdiction in Behring Sea. The terms of nearly all of these
statutes are such as to make them applicable not only to
the citizens of the enacting state, but also to foreigners.
In view of the recent decision of the Behring Sea Arbitrators, there seems to be no escape from the conclusion that
as regards the citizens of foreign nations sailing or hunting
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in any'of these waters beyond the three-mile limit, these
laws are absolutely without authority. It is now permissible for the crew of an American vessel to hunt for fur-seals in the waters of New Zealand and the Falkland Islands, or for hair-seals in the White Sea, or for pearls and
cbrals off the coasts of Ceylon, or Sardinia,. or Sicily, or
Algiers, or Panama, or Mexico, or to dredge for oysters bff
the coast 9f Ireland, or to trap herring on the coast of
Scotland, or to catch whales at forbidden seasons. off the
coast of Norway. The fact that such promiscuous and
unregulated hunting or fishing is likely to diminish or
exterminate such fisheries can no longer be alleged as an
excuse for national interference. In fact, this doctrine
would have to be applied even to such an extreme case as
that suggested by Mr. Phelps in a letter written by him to
the State Department when he was United States Minister
at London. He instaficed the case of the killing of fish
by the scattering of poison at some point off the coast of
a friendly nation just outside of the three-mile limit,
causing thereby the destruction of valuable fisheries within
its territorial waters. Outrageous as such a breach of
international courtesy would be, nevertheless it would
seem to follow from the present decision that the nation
whose interests were so attacked could not lawfully defend
them.
These conclusions, which follow inevitably from the
propositions which the Arbitrators have laid down, involve
a more extended application of the three-mile rule than has
ever hitherto been contemplated. Up to the present time
it has had more of the character of a special rule applicable
to particular classes of cases, which have either become the
subject of a recognized international usage, or have been
expressly designated in particular treaties and statutes.
This fact becomes evident when we consider the manner in
which the rule originated and has since been developed,
and the theory upon which it is based. It was originally
suggested by a celebrated law-writer, named Bynkershoeck,
in the year 1702, in a work entitled "De Dominio Maris."

-
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He advanced the proposition that the authority of a state
over its marginal waters is limited to the range of cannon,
expressing this thought in the Latin phrase, afterwards so
widely quoted, "oteslas finilur ubi ftnitur arnorurn vis."
The rule was based on the theory that a nation has a right
to protect its territory from attack by extending its jurisdiction over as much of the open sea as it can control from the
shore. Other continental jurists of the last century gave
their support to the new rule, and fixed the limit suggested
by it at three marine miles, which was the average range
of marine ordnance at that time. English writers, such as
Blackstone and Chitty, did not, however, accept the rule at
all, but inclined the rather to favor the older doctrine that the
prerogative of the British Crown extended over those wide
areas of water adjacent to the coast which had been termed
the "King's Chambers' and the "narrow seas." To the
British Courts, of Admiralty the three-mile rule was u'nknown until the year I8oo, when in the celebrated case of
the Twee Gebroeder Lord STOWELL held that the capture
of four Dutch ships by a -British cruiser, during the wai
with Holland, was illegal because made within three miles
of the coast of a neutral State. The rule had previously
been adopted in several treaties relating to the subject
of neutrality, and since that time it has been adopted
in numerous other treaties, and also in severat English
statutes. In deciding the celebrated case of the "Franconia," in th& year 1876, Lord Chief Justice COCKBURN,
after tracing the origin and history of the rule, divided the
instances in which it had been applied by statutes, treaties
and interriatihnal usage into four classes. These four
classes embraced cases relating to ocean fisheries, the collec-"
tion of national revenue, the regulation of coast navigation,
and neutrality. The fact that the Arbitrators were careful
to use the phrase "seal fisheries in their decision; instead
of treating the seal as essentially a land animal, indicates
that in their opinion the Behring Sea case would come
under the first head of this four-fold classification. It
should be remarked, however, that hitherto the rule has

.
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not been universally applied even within the limits of these
designated classes. Numerous instances of the exercise of
natonal control overfisheries located beyond the three-mile
line have already been cited. Certain of our revenue
laws are enforced, in accordance with their own express
provisions at a distance of twelve miles from our coasts.
An Act passed by the British Parliament in 1816,
which was designed to prevent the rescue of Napoleon
from St. Helena, affected navigation for a distance of
twenty-four miles. With the gradual increase in the
range of cannon it has become the opinion of most
writers on international law that in cases of neutrality a
limit of nine miles should be imposed to correspond
with the increased range of modern ordnance. Thus
it would appear that prior to the recent arbitration it could
scarcely be said that the three-mile rule was becoming any
more widely extended or firmly fixed with the passage of
time. On the contrary, it is a noticeable fact that recent
text-writers, like Hdl, speak much less positively about the
binding effect of the three-mile rule than older writers like
Wheaton and Dana, Now, under these circumstances,
two courses were open to the Arbitrators to follow. One
was to treat the three-mile rule as a general rule of law
which must necessarily determine all new cases which are
in any respect analogous to established precedents; the other
course was to hold that it has no necessary bearing upon
any new case outside of those which have become settled
by international usage or by the authority of treaties.
They might have held, for example, that while the rule
would have to be enforced with regard to such ordinary
fisheries as those to which it had frequently been applied
in other instances, it wonld not be proper to apply it
to cases where the preservation of fisheries of an exceptional character required the enforcement of rules and
restrictions at a greater distance from land. It is certainly
a grave question whether it is not a desirable thing that a
nation should be permitted to regulate and control such
marginal fisheries, and whether the development of the
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principles of international law in this direction would not
be beneficial to the interests of the world at large. Crtainly great harm may. ensue in cases of this character
from the absence of all regulations except such as may be
established" through the tardy and uncertain medium of
international conventions. The Arbitrators, however, have
adopted the forner of the two alternatives presented to
them, and held that the three-mile rule is sufficiently
general to include such a case as that of the seal fisheries;
and, by, so deciding the question have necessarily rendered
it illegal henceforth for any nation to protect its coast fisheries over a greater area than that which the rule pre.
scribes.
V. From this last proposition another and still wider
proposition of law necessarily follows. If the. three-mile
rule applies to the seal fisheries in Behring Sea because it
has been adopted in practice and embodied in treaties
relating to other kinds of fisheries, then the rule must also
be universally binding- within the three other groups of.
cases within which, as already stated, it has been adopted. ,
and enforced at different times; and as these groups on
examination will be found to embrace all of the more ia-portant purposes for which a limited marine jurisdiction is
appropriate at the present day, the further propositionwould
seem to be established that in all cases where a nation has
a marine jurisdiction which is limited, as contrasted with'
those cases, such as the enforcement of municipal law on
on board of merchant vessels, where its jurisdiction extends over the entire sea, the measure of that limitation is
always and"invariably the three-mile line.
The Arbitrators must necessarily have reached theconclusion that the rule in question is binding on the seal
fisheries by a course df reasoning from analogy. If then, it
is universally applicable to all fisheries, without r~gard to
time, or place, or peculiar circumstances, then it must be
equally binding in all cases, for example, which relate to
the collection of the revenue. Our statute which extends
the national jurisdiction over foreign vessels for certain
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revenue purposes .when they have come within twelve
miles of the coast, must necessarily be illegal as regards
that portion of the distance in excess of three miles. The
same principle must also hold in neutrality cases. It is a
very old rule of international law that if two belligerents engage in naval warfare within cannon-shot, that is to
say within three miles of a neutral country, they are guilty
of violating its neutrality, and can be compelled to 'surrender any prize which they may capture under these conditions. This principle has been asserted by Wheaton,
*Vattel and the most eminent text writers, and it has been
embodied in many treaties, among others the Jay Treaty
of i794 between this country and iEugland. As already
stated it was also enunciated by Lord STOWELL in the
early case of the Twee Gebroeder. The theory on which
this rule has always been applied to such cases is that a
neutral state has an obvious right to immunity from the
danger and inconvenience to itself which would necessarily
result from a naval battle between two belligerents within
" cannon-shot" of its coasts. Now at. the time this prin'ciple was first laid down the phrase "cannon-shot" was
always taken to mean three ini~es, and since the Arbitrators
have implied in their decision that there is no elasticity
about the three-mile rule which will admit of its being
modified in any way, or varied to meet new conditions, it
follows that this phrase would have to be interpreted in
neutrality cases arising at the present day in the same
manner as it was interpreted a century ago. Let us, then,
suppose that two iron-clads, equipped with modem ordnance,
were to engage in a battle at a distance, say of five miles,
from the coast of some neutral state. It is probable- that
many of the shots fired during such an encounter would
reach the shore and that they might prove most destructive
to neutral property and possibly to human life. It is difficult to see, however, in view of the present decision, upon
what ground the nation sustaining such a wrong could
complain that its neutrality had been invaded, or could
demand that a prize taken under such conditions should be
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restored. In fact, it would appear to be doubtful whether
a neutral state, which had reason to anticipate such an
encounter, would have. any right to forbid to a belligerent
ane the use of the open sea for such a purpose ; and yet, in
point of fact, the principle underlying the three-'mile rule'
would apply to such a case as fully as to a naval combat
within the distance it prescribes.
Is it then correct to assuine that the effect of the
Behring Sea decision is to make this rule universally.
applicable with regard to maritime rights and obligations?
Will it ever again be possible for any civilized nation to
assert its authority in time of peace, upon the 6 pen sea,
more than three miles from land? These are questions of
far greater importance to the world than the decision .of
the comparativelf narrow issues involved in any single
controversy. In attempting to answer these questions it is,
necessary to distinguish between two. kinds of maritime
jurisdictioii, and two classes of maritime rights. On the
one hand, there is a large class of cases of a nature jimilar
to those which we have just been considering, which
relate, for example, to. such matters as the control of fisheries, or the protection of neutral waters. The maritime
jurisdiction of a state for purposes of this kind must neces-'
sarily be limited by arbitrary boundaries. Formerly, these,
boundary lines were often very remote from' land, but, as
we have seen, they must be measured henceforth at a distance of three miles. But there is another kind of maritime jurisdiction which extends over the high seas without
any geographical limits whatsoever, and which is of the
same validity in every part of the world. Of such a character, for example, is the right of a state to enforce its
laws on board of ships carrying the flag, both with repect
to its own citizens and to foreigners. Another instance is
the right of a state to punish marine torts inflicted upon
its ships in time of peace, such as that committed in the
celebrated case of the "Marianna Flora;" or on other kinds,
of national property-such, for example, as the Atlantic
cable. A good illustration of the same kind of jurisdic-
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tion, in time of war, is the right of a belligerent to seize
a neutral ship for carrying contraband goods, or for breaking g blockade. Again, it is well settled that whenever a
warship possesses, upon any ground, the right of "visitation and searcr," that right can be exercised in one part
of the open sea as lawfully as in any other part. Now,
with regard to maritime jurisdiction of this latter class, the
B'ehring Sea decision has no possible bearing or application. The decision leaves it entirely untouched. But with
regard to maritime jurisdiction of the former class, which
from the nature of the case must be confined within some
arbitrary limit, it is difficult to see how it can ever again
be peaceably asserted beyond the three-mile line. In other
words, the terms of the Behring Sea decision appear
'lhecessarily to involve the abolition of all other marine
jurisdictional limits whatsoever..
Certain other propositions of law which appear to follow from the decision can be very briefly stated.
VI. One of these propositions is that, for the future,
no difference will be recognized in international law between
near .and remote parts of the world in the decision of questions affecting maritime rights. In the case of Church v.
Hubbard, in 2 Cranch, 187, Chief Justice MARSHALL held
that the seizure of a foreign vessel at a distance of fifteen
miles from the coast of Brazil, for the intended violation of
gertain municipal laws of Portugal relating to colonial
trade,' might properly be regarded as a valid seizure in
remote seas, such as those bounding the coast of South
"Amnerica, when it would be clearly illegal in more frequented waters like the British Channel. This proposition
of international law must now be regarded as overruled,
since the Behring Sea Arbitrators have virtually held that
the rule of the three-mile limit is as binding in seas
which are remote and little navigated as in those seas
which are adjacent to large commercial countries.
- VII.
The decision of the Arbitrators is also likely to
have a notable effect upon the future interpretation of a
certain class of municipal statutes. It is a familiar princi-
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pie of law that all the criminal legislation of a country is
binding upon foreigners, -while they are within its territorial limits, which for this purpose have been construed' to
include its merchant vessels wheh at sea. Since this
decision narrows the territorial jurisdiction of a country
on the high seas, for nearly all purposes, to three niiles,
it follows that henceforth general statutes, which by their
terms extend beyond that limit, must, whenever such
a course is possible, be construed as intended by the
law-making power to apply beyond that diststuce only
to its own citizens or subjects.
For example,. the
Scotch .Rerring Fishery Act, 1889, already mentioned,
imposes a penalty upon "any person" committing certain
acts in extra-territorial waters. Words like these, which
before the present decision might well have been interpreted to apply to foreigners, must now be interpreted to
apply only to the citizens of the enacting state.
VIII. The Behring Sea decision also furnishes one
more precedent in support of a proposition of international
law which was laid down nearly a century ago by Lord
STOWELL in the celebrated case of "Le Louis," and whiclf
has since been affirmed by several text-writers, viz.: that the
right of "visitation and search" cannot lawfully. be exercised upon the high seas by any nation in time of peace
Lastly, the Behring Sea Arbitration is likely to prove
of immeasurable benefit to the world in that it has fur-'
nished one more instance of the peaceful settlement of a
most serious international dispute by the submission of the
questions at issue to an impartial judicial authority.-

